“Despite the blustery talk from the White House about “all options being on the table” for dealing with Al Qaeda in Pakistan, the thrust of US plans is more about winning “hearts and minds” and less about unilateral military intervention.” — from the Christian Science Monitor article Can US woo Al Qaeda’s own haven?
Think about that. After all the horrors it has perpetrated with its murderous foreign policy, the Bush Administration, apparently, still believes it can win the “hearts and minds” of Muslims. So what gives them that confidence? Could it be:
• the illegal war in Iraq were “shock and awe” was the official policy — and still seems to be?
• the policies of torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and the policies of rendition?
• the absolute backing of Israel against the Palestinians, no matter what the issue?
• the flooding of the Middle East, and mainly Israel, with the recently announced $63 billion of weapons of “shock and Awe?”
• Along with NATO forces, the catastrophic bombings of innocents in Afghanistan?
• the constant badgering of Pakistan President Musharraf to get after the Muslim radicals in Waziristan?
I mean, if you were a Muslim, anywhere, the US included, wouldn’t you reasonable conclude that the Bush Administration really is off on some crusade against the Muslims?
So, now we learn that what the Bush people now mean by “winning hearts and minds” is a pay-off, and compared to the $63 billion in bullets, a pretty paltry one at that:
On State Department and Pentagon drawing boards are plans to spend more than $1 billion over five years on a campaign in the remote tribal areas, where the latest National Intelligence Estimate says Al Qaeda has rebuilt its organization. The US effort is in part an economic development program and in part a military plan, similar to that in Iraq’s Anbar Province, which is aimed at winning over local tribesmen in the battle with Al Qaeda. To work, the US effort would rely heavily on cooperation with the government of President Pervez Musharraf.
Despite support for the broad goal of denying Al Qaeda and Islamist extremism a sanctuary in these areas of Pakistan, questions remain in Congress and among experts over specifics – such as who would receive the sums of money, who would be accountable for them, and how to ensure they wouldn’t fall into the wrong hands. As one example, Congress has held up approving the millions of dollars the administration seeks for training and equipping the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
The idea would be to turn the corps against Al Qaeda, much as the US military in Iraq has forged alliances with Sunni tribes to take on Al Qaeda in Iraq. But Congress so far has balked at the Pakistan plan because of qualms over the tribesmen’s allegiance and over funding fighters who are not part of the country’s armed forces.
