The end of Unilaterialism is the beginning … of what?

Just as an intelligent person seeks the council of others before acting precipitously, so a nation is well advised to seek the council of other respected countries before acting with a show of force.

That would seem to be little more than common sense, for a number of reasons: with the participation of others there are useful vantage points from disparate places about the globe; there is safety in numbers; there is augmented justification and when things don’t quite work out as planned, there is shared blame and more opportunity for bail-outs.

This is a lesson the US is just now learning and while that may seem incredible, it is true.

Take for instance this article in the Washington Post today entitled The Next Intervention by two respected foreign policy intellectuals, Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan. Amazingly, this is the very point they are making:

To forge a renewed political consensus on the use of force, we first need to recognize that international legitimacy does matter. It matters to Americans, who want to believe they are acting justly and are troubled if others accuse them of selfish, immoral or otherwise illegitimate behavior. It matters to our democratic friends and allies, whose support may attest to the justness of the cause and whose participation may often be necessary to turn a military victory into a lasting political success.

Astonishing, isn’t it, that they feel the need to make that point as if it wasn’t the single take-away from Viet Name and a signal take-away from Iraq and one of the great positive lessons from Kosovo.

Yet there it is, not once, but twice, as if that unalterable truism isn’t on page 1 of War for Dummies:

A policy of seeking consensus among the world’s great democratic nations can form the basis for a new domestic consensus on the use of force. It would not exclude efforts to win Security Council authorization. Nor would it preclude using force even when some of our democratic friends disagree. But the United States will be on stronger ground to launch and sustain interventions when it makes every effort to seek and win the approval of the democratic world.

Make that three time because this sentence sums up the entire admission:

But the United States will be on stronger ground to launch and sustain interventions when it makes every effort to seek and win the approval of the democratic world.

But there is a flaw to this analysis that the authors’ don’t addressed. The US, in seeking support, is really seeking followers.

For a variety of reasons, the US hates the UN, not a John Bolton hatred but a near-Bolton hatred. The US mistrusts any leadership but its own and will only condone UN participation when the UN follows, never when it leads. Ditto NATO. The US sees themselves as pussies when, say, the French are in command: no one orders a Superpower around.

And that is a stumbling flaw to their analysis — that perhaps everyone but an American will quickly see.

When the US seeks participation in its foreign wars, and it must, it must also seek the collaboration of trusted equals.

And that it will never, ever do.